An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After \u3cem\u3eClove\u3c/em\u3e,\u3cem\u3eTuna II\u3c/em\u3e, and \u3cem\u3eCool\u3c/em\u3e by Carlone, Jonathan
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 1 Article 5
2-13-2014
An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After
Clove,Tuna II, and Cool
Jonathan Carlone
Boston College Law School, jonathan.carlone@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the Law and
Politics Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School.
For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Carlone, An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After Clove,Tuna II, and Cool, 37 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 103 (2014),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol37/iss1/5
AN ADDED EXCEPTION TO THE TBT 
AGREEMENT AFTER CLOVE,  
TUNA II, AND COOL 
Jonathan Carlone* 
Abstract: In three 2012 cases, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
found a United States regulation inconsistent with Article 2.1 but consis-
tent with Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement). Article 2.1 contains the TBT Agreement’s non-
discrimination obligations and Article 2.2 requires regulations to not be 
more trade restrictive than necessary. Despite the fact that violating Arti-
cle 2.1 does not necessarily implicate Article 2.2, international trade theo-
rists questioned whether the Appellate Body purposely avoided finding 
any of the regulations more trade restrictive than necessary. This Note ar-
gues that the Appellate Body showed its preference for finding violations 
under Article 2.1, as opposed to Article 2.2, by making it difficult for 
complainants to succeed with an Article 2.2 claim. Because it was more 
comfortable finding violations under the guise of discrimination, how-
ever, the Appellate Body added a necessity test to Article 2.1. Although 
this reading of Article 2.1 limits the regulatory authority of WTO Mem-
bers, it successfully tests necessity and thus gives the TBT Agreement 
force, while also showing deference to regulatory sovereignty by function-
ing like an exception provision. 
Introduction 
 In three separate disputes in 2012, United States—Measures Affecting 
the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (U.S.–Clove Cigarettes), United 
States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products (U.S.–Tuna II), and United States—Certain Country of 
Origin Labeling (U.S.–COOL), the World Trade Organization’s Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) ruled that a United States regulation violated 
Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement).1 Despite its purportedly well-intentioned regulatory ob-
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jectives–-preventing youth smoking, protecting dolphins, and providing 
consumers with national origin information for meat products–-the 
United States now has to amend or repeal all three regulations in order 
to comply with these rulings.2 If the United States fails to comply, then 
it will become vulnerable to retaliatory trade action, likely in the form 
of higher tariffs on U.S. goods from the complainants in these disputes, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Canada.3 
 These three cases are of particular importance, not only for the 
effect they will have on U.S. efforts to regulate cigarettes, tuna fishing, 
and meat sales, but also because together they provide needed context 
for interpreting the TBT Agreement.4 Before these cases, TBT Agree-
ment jurisprudence was lacking, which left its scope ambiguous.5 This 
new jurisprudence comes at an appropriate time because World Trade 
Organization (WTO) members are increasingly using technical barriers 
to trade (TBTs), including product, labeling, and packaging require-
ments.6 Therefore, more disputes will likely be brought under the TBT 
Agreement.7 
 As welcome as this new jurisprudence is, the WTO Appellate 
Body’s (Appellate Body) analyses have raised additional questions 
about how the TBT Agreement should be interpreted.8 Particularly 
noteworthy is the fact that, in each of the three cases, the regulation in 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Arbitration Under Article 21.3 (c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling, 
¶ 123, WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23 (Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter U.S.–COOL Compliance 
Report]; Agreement Under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States–Measures Concerning 
the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381 (Sept. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter U.S.–Tuna II Compliance Report]. The United States agreed to implement 
recommendations and rulings by July 13, 2013. Id. Status Report Regarding Implementa-
tion Regarding DSB Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute, United States–Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406 (Dec. 6, 2012) [hereinafter 
U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Compliance Report]. 
3 See Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade Law: 
Problems, Cases, and Materials 52–53 (2008). 
4 See Layton et al., supra note 1. 
5 Id.; see also Michael Ming Du, Domestic Regulatory Autonomy Under the TBT Agreement: 
From Non-Discrimination to Harmonization, 6 Chinese J. of Int’l Law 269, 270 (2007). 
6 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2012 Trade and Public Policies: A Closer Look at 
Non-Tariff Measures in the 21st Century, 126–27 (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf. 
7 See id. 
8 See Gregory Shaffer, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 192, 192–99 (2013); Joost Pauwelyn, 
COOL . . . But What Is Left Now for TBT Art. 2.2?, Int’l Econ. L. and Pol’y Blog (July 3, 
2012, 2:46 PM), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2012/07/cool-but-what-is-
left-now-of-tbt-art-22.html. 
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question was found to violate the non-discrimination obligations of Ar-
ticle 2.1, but not Article 2.2, which requires that regulations be no more 
“trade restrictive than necessary.”9 Articles 2.1 and 2.2 are not so closely 
related that violation of one necessarily implicates the other.10 But, con-
sidering the varying effects that the three regulations in question had 
on trade, and the Appellate Body’s analyses under each article, some 
international trade theorists have suggested that the Appellate Body 
purposively avoided finding a violation using necessity under Article 2.2 
and instead relied too much on non-discrimination under Article 2.1.11 
 This Note questions whether the Appellate Body actively avoided 
finding the measures in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, U.S.–Tuna II, and U.S.–
COOL inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and instead 
gave Article 2.1 too much force in order to find violations. Part I intro-
duces the TBT Agreement and discusses its development. It also de-
scribes the factual contexts that gave rise to these three cases. Part II 
discusses the scope of the TBT Agreement before the three cases. It 
goes on to compare the Appellate Body’s Article 2.1 and Article 2.2 
analyses in each case. Part III argues that the Appellate Body was more 
willing to find violations of the TBT Agreement using discrimination 
rather than necessity and theorizes why that was the case. Additionally, 
it argues that the Appellate Body’s unwillingness to find a violation un-
der Article 2.2 appropriately protects the regulatory power of WTO 
members. Finally, it argues that the Appellate Body did not give Article 
2.1 too much force; it instead applied an effective test that successfully 
balances the regulatory authority of WTO members with trade liberali-
zation. 
                                                                                                                      
9 Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling, ¶¶ 350, 491, 
WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R ( June 29, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Re-
port, United States–COOL]; Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶¶ 299, 331, WT/DS381/AB/R 
(May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, United States–Tuna II]; Appellate Body 
Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 298, 
WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, United States–Clove 
Cigarettes]. 
10 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, arts. 2.1, 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
11 See Pauwelyn, supra note 8. 
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I. Background 
A. Origins of the TBT Agreement 
 The WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), have been, and continue to be, successful in ex-
panding international trade by eliminating protectionist policies like 
tariffs and quotas.12 With this success, attention turned to less obvious 
trade barriers, such as domestic technical regulations.13 Technical regu-
lations are product, labeling, and packaging requirements that must be 
met to sell a product in a certain domestic market.14 These require-
ments can restrict international trade by raising the cost of business for 
producers, who likely have to modify their products to satisfy the differ-
ing requirements imposed by different markets.15 Not surprisingly, 
States can design these technical regulations to protect domestic indus-
try.16 
 Out of concern that technical regulations would be used as protec-
tionist tools, the forty-three Contracting Parties of the GATT, at the 
conclusion of the 1979 Tokyo Round, signed the Standards Code.17 
This code established the principle that technical regulations should 
not be used as barriers to trade.18 It also preserved the right of the Con-
tracting Parties to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their people 
and their environment.19 The code attempted to achieve these princi-
ples by prohibiting discrimination through product specifications, us-
ing language similar to GATT Article III:4.20 Additionally, the Standards 
                                                                                                                      
 
12 See Robert Howse & Elizabeth Türk, The WTO Impact Upon Internal Regulations: A Case 
Study of the Canada–EC Asbestos Dispute, in Trade and Human Health and Safety 77, 78–
79 (G. Bermann & P. Mavroidis eds. 2006); Petros C. Mavroidis, The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 7–9, (2005). 
13 Howse & Türk, supra note 12, at 79–80; Ming Du, supra note 5, at 270. 
14 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Shoenbaum, & Petros Mavroidis, The World 
Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 132 (2003). 
15 See id. at 132; Howse & Türk, supra note 12, at 79. 
16 Howse & Türk, supra note 12, at 79. 
17 Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of 
Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary Phyto-
Sanitary and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in Trade and Human Health and 
Safety, supra note 12, at 9, 12. 
18 Id. at 11–12. 
19 Id.; Andrew Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism: Re-imagining the 
Global Economic Order 250 (2011). 
20 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. III:4, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (“The products 
of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contract-
ing party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like prod-
2014] The Fate of Domestic Regulations in the WTO After Cloves, Tuna II, and COOL 107 
Code prohibited regulations from being more trade restrictive than 
necessary, and urged its Contracting Parties to harmonize their regula-
tions using international standards and collaborations.21 But within a 
short amount of time, it was clear the Standards Code was not effec-
tively achieving its purpose.22 This was due in large part to the fact that 
it was a “plurilateral agreement,” and thus only binding on the signing 
countries, who were at a relative disadvantage compared to non-signing 
GATT countries.23 
 To remedy the failures of the Standards Code, the GATT parties 
developed the TBT Agreement and the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) in the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations.24 The SPS Agreement explicitly addresses the health and 
safety measures intended to protect humans, animals, and plants from 
disease and food risks, whereas the TBT Agreement applies to all other 
technical regulations.25 Both agreements were added as WTO obliga-
tions in a “single undertaking” with the signing of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the WTO.26 Consequently, the TBT Agreement 
and SPS Agreement, unlike the Standards Code they replaced, are 
binding on all WTO Members.27 Now every domestic regulation im-
plemented by a WTO Member can be reviewed by the Dispute Settle-
ment Body and can be deemed in violation of one of these treaties.28 If 
the Dispute Settlement Body finds that a domestic regulation violates 
one of these treaties, the violating member must repeal or amend the 
                                                                                                                      
ucts of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provi-
sions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transporta-
tion charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of 
transport and not on the nationality of the product.”); Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Mar. 1980, art. 2.1, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 2 (1980) [hereinafter Standards 
Code] (“Products imported from the territory of any Party shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country in relation to such technical regulations or standards.”). 
21 See Standards Code, supra note 20, arts. 2.1–.4; Lang, supra note 19, at 250; Marceau 
& Trachtman, supra note 17, at 12. 
22 Donna Roberts, Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations, 1 J. Econ. L. 377, 380 (1998). 
23 Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 17, at 12. 
24 Id. at 13. 
25 WTO Secretariat, Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements 62 (1999) [here-
inafter WTO Guide]; see Matsushita et al., supra note 14, at 12; Roberts, supra note 22, 
at 382. 
26 Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 17, at 13. 
27 Id.; WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 71. 
28 See WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 71. 
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regulation.29 If the violating member fails to do so, the WTO will allow 
the complaining member to retaliate by suspending a WTO benefit.30 
 Similar to the Standards Code, the WTO attempts to balance its 
members’ regulatory concerns with its efforts to liberalize trade 
through the TBT Agreement.31 The preamble of the TBT Agreement 
states the purpose of the agreement is to “ensure that technical regula-
tions and standards . . . do not create unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade;” it also notes, however, that “no country should be pre-
vented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its 
exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices . . . .”32 
It was uncertain how the WTO would go about balancing its TBT 
Agreement objectives.33 U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, U.S.–Tuna II, and U.S.–
COOL provided the first opportunities for the Appellate Body to ana-
lyze a dispute under key provisions of this Agreement.34 Thus, these 
cases are significant because the rules they established will be applied 
to future TBT disputes.35 
B. Context for Interpreting the TBT: A Trio of Cases 
1. Case One: U.S.–Clove Cigarettes 
 To reduce the number of young Americans who start to smoke, 
the United States House Energy and Commerce Committee proposed 
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA).36 
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed the FSPTCA into law.37 Be-
cause of this law, the production and sale of all flavored cigarettes are 
banned in the United States.38 Although this law banned clove ciga-
                                                                                                                      
29 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. at 466–67; Matsushita et al., supra note 14, at 132; WTO Guide, supra note 
25, at 71. 
32 TBT Agreement, supra note 10, pmbl. 
33 See Ming Du, supra note 5, at 283–84. 
34 Tania Voon, International Decision: United States–Measure Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 828 (2012). 
35 See id.; Layton et al., supra note 1. 
36 H.R. Rep. No. 111-58, pt. 1, at 2–3, 37. 
37 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 
47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2009, at A15. 
38 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907 (a)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. 
§ 387(g)(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2010). 
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rettes, it provided an exception for menthol cigarettes.39 The United 
States claimed that the legislation excluded menthol cigarettes because 
more Americans, other than the youth, smoke them, and the effects of 
prohibiting them were not adequately evaluated.40 
 Menthol cigarettes are primarily produced in the United States, 
whereas clove cigarettes are primarily produced in Indonesia.41 Indo-
nesia challenged this law as inconsistent with several WTO obligations, 
including Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.42 The Panel and 
Appellate Body each found the cigarette ban inconsistent with Article 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement.43 The Panel found the cigarette ban consis-
tent with Article 2.2, and Indonesia did not appeal that ruling.44 The 
United States, however, appealed the Panel’s ruling that the cigarette 
ban violated Article 2.1.45 Using different reasoning, the Appellate 
Body upheld the Panel’s ruling.46 
2. Case Two: U.S.–Tuna II 
 In 2009, Mexico challenged the consistency of the United States’ 
dolphin-safe labeling scheme under the Dolphin Protection Consumer 
Information Act, its regulations, and the Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth 
decision with the TBT Agreement.47 This labeling scheme was primar-
                                                                                                                      
 
39 Id. 
40 First Written Submission of the United States, United States–Measures Affecting the Pro-
duction and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 148–150, WT/DS406 (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2396 [hereinafter U.S. First Written Submission]. 
41 Press Release, World Trade Org., U.S. Blocks Indonesian Request for Panel on Clove 
Cigarettes ( June 22, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/ 
dsb_22jun10_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Press Release]. Indonesia stated that over six mil-
lion Indonesians depend directly or indirectly on clove cigarette production. Id. 
42 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Indonesia, United States–Measures Af-
fecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 1–2, WT/DS406/2 ( June 11, 2010) [herein-
after Indonesia’s Panel Request]. 
43 Appellate Body Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 9, ¶ 234; see Panel 
Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 7.293, 
WT/DS406/R (Sep. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes]. 
44 Panel Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.429–.432; Tania Voon, 
The WTO Appellate Body Outlaws Discrimination in U.S. Flavored Cigarette Ban, 16 Am. Soc’y 
Int’l L. (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.asil.org/insights120430.cfm. 
45 See Appellant Submission of the United States, United States–Measures Affecting the 
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 70, WT/DS406, ( Jan. 5, 2012), available at http:// 
www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3225 [hereinafter U.S. Clove Appeal]. 
46 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 9, ¶ 234. 
47 See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico, United States–Measures Con-
cerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 1–2, WT/DS381/4 
(Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Mexico’s Tuna II Panel Request]; Dolphin Protection Con-
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ily designed to prevent harmful tuna fishing practices in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific (ETP).48 In the ETP, tuna schools frequently swim un-
derneath dolphins; consequently, tuna trawlers set their nets on the 
dolphins to catch the schools below.49 This fishing practice risks seri-
ously injuring or killing dolphins.50 Accordingly, the requirements to 
obtain a “dolphin-safe” label under the U.S. scheme for tuna caught in 
the ETP are stricter than for tuna caught elsewhere.51 
 Mexico argued that the labeling scheme prevented its tuna prod-
ucts, which primarily consist of tuna caught by setting on dolphins in 
the ETP, from being deemed “dolphin-safe” even though they are har-
vested in a way considered dolphin safe by a multilateral agreement 
with the United States.52 Additionally, Mexico argued that tuna prod-
ucts from other countries, including the United States, get the “dol-
phin-safe” label under less rigorous requirements.53 The Panel con-
cluded that the United States labeling scheme was consistent with 
Article 2.1, but inconsistent with Article 2.2.54 Both Mexico and the 
United States appealed.55 The Appellate Body reversed, finding the 
labeling scheme inconsistent with Article 2.1, but consistent with Article 
2.2.56 
3. Case Three: U.S.–COOL 
 In U.S.–COOL, Canada and Mexico, using the TBT Agreement, 
challenged the United States’ country of origin labeling scheme for 
                                                                                                                      
sumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012); Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 
757 (9th Cir. 2007). 
48 Shaffer, supra note 8, at 196. 
49 Id. at 193. 
50 Id. 
51 See Elizabeth Trujillo, The Tuna-Dolphin Encore—WTO Rules on Environmental Labeling, 
ASIL INSIGHT (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/7/tuna-
dolphin-encore-wto-rules-environmental-labeling. 
52 See Mexico’s Tuna II Panel Request, supra note 47, at 1; Shaffer, supra note 8, at 193. 
53 See Mexico’s Tuna II Panel Request, supra note 47, at 1–2; Shaffer, supra note 8, at 
193. 
54 Panel Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶¶ 7.377–.378, 7.618–.621, WT/DS381/R (Sep. 15, 2011) [here-
inafter Panel Report, United States–Tuna II]. 
55 See Appellant Submission of the United States, United States–Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 24, WT/DS381, ( Jan. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3251 [hereinafter U.S. Tuna II Appeal]; 
Notification of an Other Appeal by Mexico, United States–Measures Concerning the Importa-
tion, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 1–2, WT/DS381/11, ( Jan. 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter Mexico Tuna II Appeal]. 
56 Appellate Body Report, United States–Tuna II supra note 9, ¶¶ 298–299, 331. 
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muscle cut meats, known as the COOL measure.57 The COOL measure 
consists of the following United States’ laws: the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1964, as amended by the 2002 Farm Bill and 2008 Farm Bill, the 
Agricultural Marketing Service Interim Rule, and the Final Rule 
2009.58 This measure requires muscle cut meat to be labeled in one of 
four ways.59 Label A is for meat that is born, raised, and slaughtered in 
the United States.60 Label B is for meat with multiple countries of ori-
gins, for instance, animals born in Mexico or Canada, but raised and 
slaughter in the United States.61 Label C is for meat from animals, not 
born or raised in the United States, but imported there for immediate 
slaughter.62 Finally, Label D is for meat from animals neither born, 
raised, nor slaughtered in the United States.63 Producers that mix meat 
from animals of different origin on the same production day, a practice 
known as commingling, can chose their appropriate label, usually La-
bel B or C.64 The objective of this measure was to provide consumers 
with more information about the origins of their meat products.65 The 
Panel found the COOL measure violated the national treatment obli-
gation of Article 2.1 and violated Article 2.2.66 The Appellate Body up-
held the Panel’s Article 2.1 ruling, but reversed its ruling under Article 
2.2.67 
                                                                                                                      
57See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Requests of Canada and Mexico, 
United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling Requirements, 1–2, WT/DS384/9, WT/ 
DS386/8 (May 11, 2010) [hereinafter COOL Panel Established]; Request for the Estab-
lishment of a Panel by Canada, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling Requirements, 
at 1–2, WT/DS384/8 (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Canada’s Panel Request]. 
58 Panel Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling, ¶¶ 7.34, 7.45, 
WT/DS384/R/WT/DS386/R (Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report, United States–
COOL]; Joshua Meltzer, The WTO Ruling on U.S. Country of Origin Labeling (“COOL”), n. 4, 
16 Am. Soc’y Int’l Law ( July 18, 2012), available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/ 
files/insight120718.pdf; 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012); Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA, 
74 Fed. Reg. 10, 2670 (2009). 
59 Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, ¶ 7.89. 
60 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2)(A) (2012); Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, 
¶ 7.89. 
61 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2)(B); Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, ¶ 7.89; 
Meltzer, supra note 58. 
62 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2)(C); Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, ¶ 7.89. 
63 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2)(D); Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, ¶ 7.89. 
64 See Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA, 74 Fed. Reg. 10, 2670 (2009); Meltzer, su-
pra note 58. 
65 First Written Submission of the United States, United States–Certain Country of Origin 
Labeling, ¶¶ 206–225, WT/DS384/386 (Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter COOL U.S. First Written 
Submission]. 
66 Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, ¶¶ 7.548, 7.720. 
67 Appellate Body Report, United States–COOL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 350, 470. 
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II. Discussion 
A. Scope of the TBT Agreement 
1. Technical Regulations 
 As a threshold matter, the TBT Agreement is applicable in a dis-
pute only if the measure in question is a “technical regulation.”68 A 
technical regulation, as defined by Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, is 
a document that applies to an identified product, which details one or 
more characteristics of the product, and requires compliance with 
those product characteristics.69 For example, in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, the 
Panel found the United States’ flavored cigarette ban to be a technical 
regulation because the law expressly identifies the products it covered, 
“cigarettes and any of their component parts;” it identifies product 
characteristics in the negative form: “a cigarette . . . shall not contain;” 
and it is mandatory.70 Similarly, in U.S.–COOL, the Panel concluded 
that the United States’ country of origin labeling measure met the re-
quirements to be a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement.71 
The COOL measure applies to an identified group of products, muscle 
cut beef or pork; it lays down product characteristic by requiring a 
country of origin label on the identified products; and that characteris-
tic is enforced with fines indicating mandatory compliance.72 
 The Standards Code only applied to regulations that affected the 
physical product itself.73 The TBT Agreement, by contrast, also applies 
to regulations that affect the process by which the product is made or 
procured–-also known as a product’s process and production methods 
(PPMs).74 After defining a technical regulation, Annex 1.1 states “[i]t 
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packag-
ing, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, proc-
ess or production method.”75 For example, in U.S.–Tuna II, the Appel-
late Body upheld the Panel’s finding that the United States labeling 
scheme for tuna products was a technical regulation because it details 
                                                                                                                      
68 Ming Du, supra note 5, at 285. 
69 TBT Agreement, supra note 10, annex 1.1; see also Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 66–68, WT/DS135/ 
AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC–Asbestos]. 
70 Panel Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.27–.28, 7.31–.32, 
7.39–.41. 
71 See Panel Report, United States–COOL, supra note 58, ¶ 7.216. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 7.156–.62, 7.207, 7.214. 
73 WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 72. 
74 Id. 
75 TBT Agreement, supra note 10, annex 1.1. 
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one legal definition for “dolphin-safe” labeled tuna, specifies the condi-
tions that must be satisfied to use that label, and prevents alternate la-
bels concerning the safety of dolphins to be used if the specified condi-
tions are unmet.76 The identified product is dolphin-safe tuna.77 The 
detailed characteristic is that the tuna cannot be caught using the fish-
ing practice known as “setting on dolphins” in the ETP, and this charac-
teristic is mandatory because it constitutes the sole way to achieve the 
“dolphin-safe” label for tuna caught in the ETP.78 
2. Article 2.1—National Treatment and Most-Favored Nation 
 One of the main purposes for establishing the TBT Agreement was 
to prevent countries from protecting domestic industries by using 
technical regulations to discriminate against imported products.79 
Thus, to prevent protectionism through discrimination, the WTO 
drafters incorporated the GATT principles of national treatment and 
Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agree-
ment.80 Accordingly, Article 2.1 states, “[m]embers shall ensure that in 
respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory 
of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country.”81 Consequently, technical regulations 
must treat imported products no less favorably than like domestic 
products and no less favorably than like imported products from any 
other country.82 
 Article 2.1 is similar to the national treatment (Article I) and MFN 
(Article III) provisions of the GATT in that its national treatment and 
MFN obligations proscribe less favorable treatment of like products.83 
But how closely Article 2.1 followed the jurisprudence of the GATT had 
                                                                                                                      
76 Appellate Body Report, United States–Tuna II, supra note 9, ¶ 199; see also Shaffer, su-
pra note 8, at 195–96. 
77 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Tuna II supra note 9, ¶ 199. 
78 See Panel Report, United States–Tuna II, supra note 54, ¶¶ 7.76, 7.144; see also Eliza-
beth Trujillo, The WTO Appellate Body Knocks Down U.S. “Dolphin-Safe” Tuna Labels but Leaves 
a Crack for PPMs, ASIL INSIGHT ( July 26, 2012), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/ 
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79 See TBT Agreement, supra note 10, pmbl. 
80 See WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 72–73. 
81 TBT Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.1. 
82 See id.; WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 73. 
83 See TBT Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.1; General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, arts. I, III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. 
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yet to be decided.84 Before U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, no case dealt specifi-
cally with Article 2.1.85 Thus, the scope of the provision was a matter of 
debate.86 One main difference between the GATT obligations and Ar-
ticle 2.1 is that the GATT provides affirmative defenses for violations in 
its Article XX exceptions, like XX(b), which allows a violation if it is 
“necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health.”87 The TBT Agreement does not contain any similar provi-
sions.88 Without exception provisions, it was unclear how the WTO 
would be able to successfully interpret Article 2.1 to achieve its purpose 
of protecting legitimate regulation while preventing unnecessary barri-
ers to trade.89 
3. Article 2.2—Necessity Test 
 Besides attempting to prevent protectionism through discrimina-
tory technical regulations in Article 2.1, the TBT Agreement also de-
mands in Article 2.2 that technical regulations not be created to un-
necessarily obstruct trade.90 This provision encompasses the object and 
purpose of the TBT Agreement by proscribing obstacles to trade, but 
only those considered unnecessary to attain legitimate objectives.91 Ac-
cordingly, Article 2.2 states: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this 
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, tak-
ing account of the risks non-fulfillment would create. Such le-
gitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security require-
ments; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Panel Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 43, ¶ 7.80. 
85 Id. 
86 See Howse & Türk, supra note 12, at 101; Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 17, at 
19–20. 
87 GATT 1947, supra note 83, art. XX. 
88 Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 17, at 19–20. 
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90 TBT Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.2; WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 73. 
91 See WTO Guide, supra note 25, at 72. 
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information, related processing technology or intended end-
uses of products.92 
 Article 2.2 seems to follow other WTO “necessity” provisions, like 
GATT Article XX (a), (b), and (d), and Article 5.6 of the SPS Agree-
ment, but how closely it follows these other provisions was a matter of 
debate.93 Similar to Article 2.1, the DSB had not fully analyzed a dis-
pute under Article 2.2 until 2012.94 One textual difference between the 
provisions is that Article 2.2 requires consideration of “the risks of non-
fulfillment” of the member’s legitimate objective when deciding 
whether a regulation is necessary.95 Neither GATT Article XX, nor Ar-
ticle 5.6 of the SPS Agreement include this requirement.96 Additionally, 
GATT Article XX explicitly lists the objectives considered legitimate to 
the exclusion of all others, whereas, the phrase “inter alia” in Article 2.2 
indicates that its list of legitimate objectives is not exhaustive.97 Before a 
dispute was analyzed under Article 2.2, however, the provision’s scope 
was just conjecture.98 
B. The Panel and Appellate Body Decisions 
1. U.S.–Clove Cigarettes Article 2.1 National Treatment Discrimination 
 U.S.–Clove Cigarettes marked the first time in the history of the 
WTO that the Panel invalidated a technical regulation under Article 2.1 
of the TBT Agreement.99 The Panel found the United States’ flavored 
                                                                                                                      
92 TBT Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.2. 
93 See GATT 1947, supra note 83, art XX; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosantitary Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, [hereinafter SPS Agreement], art. 5.6; see also Marceau & 
Trachtman, supra note 17, at 22–30. 
94 See Panel Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 43, ¶ 7.329. Article 2.2 was 
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Products, and European Communities–Trade Description of Sardines, but the disputes were not 
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GATT 1947, supra note 83, art. XX. 
96 See SPS Agreement, supra note 93, art. 5.6; TBT Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.2; 
GATT 1947, supra note 83, art. XX. 
97 Howse & Türk supra note 12, at 105. Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement only deals 
with sanitary and phyto-sanitary objectives. See SPS Agreement, supra note 93, art. 5.6. 
98 See Howse & Türk, supra note 12, at 105–110; Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 17, 
at 28–29; Benn McGrady, Trade and Public Health: The WTO, Tobacco, Alcohol, 
and Diet 206–13 (2011); Ming Du, supra note 5, at 290–91. 
99See Panel Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 43, ¶¶ 7.80, 7.293. 
116 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:103 
cigarette ban inconsistent with Article 2.1 because it treated imported 
clove cigarettes less favorably than domestic menthol cigarettes.100 Un-
surprisingly, the United States appealed this ruling.101 
 Using the text of Article 2.1, the Appellate Body concluded that 
for a measure to be inconsistent with the national treatment obligation 
of Article 2.1, it must be a technical regulation, the imported and do-
mestic products must be like products, and the imported products 
must be treated less favorably than domestic products.102 The Panel 
concluded the cigarette ban was a technical regulation, and the United 
States did not appeal that specific finding.103 
 The United States did appeal the Panel’s finding that clove and 
menthol cigarettes are like products.104 Essentially, the United States 
argued that the Panel failed to do a complete analysis and comparison 
of consumer taste and habits and end-uses between clove and menthol 
cigarettes.105 The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings of like-
ness, relying on GATT Article III jurisprudence, which accords little 
weight to the policy behind the questioned measure.106 In terms of 
end-uses, the Appellate Body emphasized that the analysis should con-
sider the uses a product is capable of performing, and, consequently, 
accepted the United States’ recommended end-uses for cigarettes: ful-
filling a nicotine addiction; and providing pleasurable tastes and 
smells.107 According to the Appellate Body, imported clove cigarettes 
and domestic menthol cigarettes share these end-uses.108 In terms of 
consumer tastes and preferences, the Appellate Body agreed with the 
United States that the Panel should not have limited its analysis only to 
youth smokers.109 Nevertheless, because both clove and menthol ciga-
rettes are used for the purpose of starting to smoke, the Appellate Body 
found there was still enough substitutability between the products to 
find likeness.110 
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 Similarly, in regards to less favorable treatment under Article 2.1, 
the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding.111 Drawing from GATT 
Article III jurisprudence, the Appellate Body stated that, to find less 
favorable treatment, a panel should determine whether the technical 
regulation damages the competitive opportunities for an imported 
product by modifying market conditions.112 Noting that the TBT 
Agreement does not contain exception provisions, like GATT Article 
XX, the Appellate Body further stated that Article 2.1 does not prohibit 
less favorable treatment that “stems exclusively from a legitimate regu-
latory distinction.”113 The United States’ appeal questioned the Panel’s 
finding that the harm to clove cigarettes was not explained by legiti-
mate regulatory distinctions.114 The Appellate Body agreed with the 
Panel that the reasons cited for exempting menthol cigarettes—that 
more people are addicted to them and thus banning them could in-
crease healthcare costs and expand the cigarette black market—are not 
“legitimate regulatory distinctions.”115 The Appellate Body noted that 
the addictive ingredient in menthol cigarettes, nicotine, is also present 
in regular cigarettes.116 Further, the United States did not have evi-
dence to prove that menthol smokers would not switch to regular ciga-
rettes if menthol cigarettes were banned.117 
 Consequently, the Appellate Body concluded that the cigarette 
ban failed the Article 2.1 “less favorable treatment” test.118 The test was 
designed to “balance [a WTO Member’s] right to regulate with [its] 
obligation not to discriminate.”119 With its test, the Appellate Body 
wanted to stress that less favorable treatment is not simply shown by any 
uneven effect on imports.120 Instead, “the design, architecture, reveal-
ing structure, operation, and application of the technical regulation at 
issue, and, in particular, whether that technical regulation is even-
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handed” must all be considered.121 Using that test, the Appellate Body 
concluded that the cigarette ban as a whole appeared discriminatory 
and caused a disparate impact on Indonesian clove cigarettes.122 
 Finally, the Appellate Body was quick to note that, although it 
found the cigarette ban inconsistent with Article 2.1, this conclusion 
did not mean that WTO Members could not prohibit tobacco products 
or implement other public health regulations.123 In fact, the Appellate 
Body stated that the United States can continue to ban clove cigarettes 
as long as it complies with the TBT Agreement.124 
2. U.S.–Tuna II: Adding Proportionality to the Article 2.1 Test 
a. Article 2.1 National Treatment and MFN Discrimination 
 The Panel released its report in U.S.–Tuna II in 2011, and, unlike 
the Panel in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, it concluded that the technical regula-
tion at issue was consistent with Article 2.1.125 It came to this conclusion 
because the technical regulation set the same requirements for tuna 
products from any country, and thus was “origin-neutral.”126 Conse-
quently, according to the Panel, any harmful impact on Mexican tuna 
products was not a result of the technical regulation but a result of the 
decisions, including economic and marketing decisions, made by 
Mexican fishers and canners.127 Mexico appealed this finding128 and, 
subsequently, the Appellate Body reversed it.129 
 Using its analysis from U.S.–Clove Cigarettes and GATT Article III 
jurisprudence, the Appellate Body emphasized that any detrimental 
impact on the competitive opportunities for imported products due to 
a measure should be considered under Article 2.1.130 According to the 
Appellate Body, just because a measure is origin-neutral on its face does 
not mean the measure does not treat imported like products less fa-
vorably.131 The Appellate Body went on to complete the correct Article 
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2.1 test established in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes.132 The technical regulation 
and like products prongs were already satisfied, so the Appellate Body 
moved on to the less favorable treatment prong, which it evaluated in 
two steps.133 
 First, the Appellate Body determined that the technical regulation 
did in fact harm the competitive opportunities for Mexican tuna prod-
ucts because, as a result of the measure, Mexican canners were unable 
to sell tuna with a “dolphin-safe” label.134 Consequently, they were un-
able to appeal to the majority of U.S. tuna consumers.135 
 Next, the Appellate Body determined whether the harm to the 
competitive opportunities of Mexican tuna products reflects discrimi-
nation on the part of the United States or is the result of legitimate 
regulatory distinctions.136 In analyzing this prong of the test, the Appel-
late Body considered the objectives of these labeling requirements, 
which, according to the United States and confirmed by the Panel, are 
to ensure that consumers know whether their tuna was caught in a way 
harmful to dolphins, and to use the U.S. market to encourage dolphin 
safe tuna fishing.137 Because the labeling requirements are stricter for 
tuna caught within the ETP than outside it, the Appellate Body deter-
mined whether the measure was sufficiently “calibrated” to respond to 
the risks dolphins face inside and outside the ETP.138 The United States 
argued that the stricter requirements for the ETP were due to the fact 
that the dolphin-tuna relationship is stronger there, and thus more 
dolphins are likely to be hurt or killed.139 
 The Panel, however, rejected that argument.140 In upholding the 
Panel’s findings, the Appellate Body determined that the differing 
treatment in the measure was not proportionality calibrated to respond 
to the varying risks dolphins face from tuna fishing all over the 
globe.141 Consequently, it held that the harmful effects on the competi-
tive opportunities for Mexican tuna products imported to America as a 
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result of this technical regulation do not “stem from legitimate regula-
tory distinctions.”142 
 Accordingly, the Appellate Body ruled the United States’ tuna la-
beling scheme violated Article 2.1 for treating Mexican tuna products 
less favorably than domestic tuna and tuna imported from other coun-
tries.143 
b. Article 2.2: Necessity Analysis 
 The Panel in U.S.–Tuna II concluded that the United States tuna-
labeling scheme was “more trade restrictive than necessary” to fulfill its 
legitimate objective and thus violated Article 2.2 of the TBT Agree-
ment.144 It came to this conclusion by citing the documented risks dol-
phins face outside the ETP, and subsequently determining that the la-
beling scheme only partially satisfies its two objectives: (i) informing 
consumers about whether their tuna was harmful to dolphins and (ii) 
using the United States market to promote dolphin safe fishing.145 
Next, the Panel decided that an alternative proposed by Mexico, using 
the Agreement on International Dolphin Conservation Program’s 
(AIDCP) “dolphin-safe” label, which came out of a 1998 multilateral 
agreement with the United States, in conjunction with the existing 
DPCIA label, was a less trade restrictive alternative that would equally 
fulfill the United States’ objectives.146 This alternative would allow tuna 
caught by setting on dolphins in the ETP to be eligible for an AIDCP 
“dolphin-safe” label.147 
 The Appellate Body reversed this finding.148 First, the Appellate 
Body stated that in order to conduct an Article 2.2 analysis, WTO pan-
els need to weigh: “(i) the degree of contribution made by the measure 
to the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the 
measure; and (iii) the nature of the risks at issue and the gravity of con-
sequences that would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective(s) pur-
sued by the Member through the measure.”149 The Appellate Body also 
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noted that this analysis frequently should include a comparison be-
tween the measure at issue and a possible alternative measure.150 The 
burden is on the complainant to show that the measure is “more trade 
restrictive than necessary.”151 To meet its burden, according to the Ap-
pellate Body, the complainant could offer an alternative measure that is 
less restrictive.152 
 Using the Panel’s analysis of Mexico’s proposed alternative, the 
Appellate Body moved on to determine whether the alternative the 
Panel approved sufficiently satisfied the United States’ objective.153 The 
Appellate Body criticized the Panel for including tuna caught outside 
the ETP in its evaluation of the alternative measure.154 The alternative 
proposed by Mexico only changed conditions within the ETP.155 Ac-
cordingly, the Appellate Body stated that the Panel should have limited 
its comparison to conditions solely within the ETP as well.156 Within the 
ETP, the Appellate Body concluded that the existing United States la-
beling scheme fulfills its objective to a greater degree than Mexico’s 
alternative would, because even when dolphins are not killed during a 
setting, harm to the dolphins can still occur, like cow-calf separation, 
stress, and injury.157 Consequently, because Mexico’s alternative did not 
match the degree of contribution to the United States’ objective ac-
complished by the challenged labeling scheme, the Appellate Body re-
versed the Panel’s finding and deemed the United States’ tuna labeling 
scheme consistent with Article 2.2.158 
 Even though the Appellate Body found the measure inconsistent 
with Article 2.1, Mexico is not likely to benefit significantly from that 
concession.159 Because the measure is consistent with Article 2.2, the 
United States only has to make its labeling requirements outside the 
ETP match the tougher requirements inside the ETP in order to com-
ply with the ruling.160 Mexico’s tuna products primarily come from set-
ting on dolphins inside the ETP, so the United States complying with 
the Appellate Body’s ruling will probably not help Mexican tuna prod-
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ucts attain the “dolphin-safe” label.161 The Panel’s ruling was more 
beneficial to Mexico because it would have allowed Mexican tuna 
products to be labeled “dolphin-safe” in the U.S. market using the 
AIDCP label.162 
3. U.S.–COOL: Adding a Chapeau Test 
a. Article 2.1 Analysis 
 The Panel in U.S.–COOL concluded that the COOL measure vio-
lated the TBT Agreement’s national treatment obligation in Article 
2.1.163 It came to its conclusion after evaluating the measure under its 
three-prong test.164 First, the Panel found the COOL measure to be a 
technical regulation.165 Next, the Panel determined that the products 
affected by the measure were like products.166 Specifically finding that 
Canadian cattle, Mexican cattle, and U.S. cattle are like products, and 
Canadian hogs and U.S. hogs are like products.167 The Panel came to 
this conclusion using GATT Article III jurisprudence.168 In previous 
GATT disputes, products were deemed like products when they were 
only distinguished by country of origin.169 Finally, in completing its Ar-
ticle 2.1 test, the Panel concluded that the COOL measure treated Ca-
nadian and Mexican products less favorably than products from the 
United States because the measure modified the conditions of competi-
tion to the detriment of the imports.170 The Panel found that the 
COOL measure effectively forced segregation of cattle and hogs by the 
country of origin because it demanded at every stage of the supply 
chain “an unbroken chain of reliable country of origin information 
with regard to every animal and muscle cut.”171 The additional segrega-
tion costs swayed producers into using only U.S. meats; consequently, 
Canadian and Mexican imports suffered.172 
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 The United States appealed the Panel’s Article 2.1 ruling.173 The 
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s ruling, but used a different analy-
sis.174 The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that, through its pro-
motion of segregation by animal origin, the COOL measure damages 
the competitive conditions of Canadian and Mexican products.175 Fur-
ther, the Appellate Body noted that even though this measure does not 
explicitly require segregation, and instead is a result of the decisions of 
private producers, the COOL measure provides an incentive for segre-
gation.176 Citing the well-known GATT case, Korea—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, the Appellate Body stated “when-
ever the operation of a measure in the market creates incentives for 
private actors systematically to make choices in ways that benefit domes-
tic products to the detriment of like imported products, then such a 
measure may be found to treat imported products less favourably.”177 
 But after agreeing with the Panel that the measure detrimentally 
impacted Canadian and Mexican imports, the Appellate Body faulted 
the Panel for conducting an incomplete Article 2.1 analysis.178 Like it 
did in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes and U.S.–Tuna II, the Appellate Body went 
on to complete the analysis by determining whether “the detrimental 
impact stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction,” or if 
the measure was designed to “arbitrarily or unjustifiably” discriminate 
against imports.179 
 Ultimately, it decided that the detrimental impact was due to arbi-
trary and unjustifiable discrimination because it could not be explained 
by a legitimate regulatory distinction.180 The United States’ objective 
for the COOL measure was to provide consumers with information on 
the origin of their meat products.181 Most of that information, though, 
does not make it onto the labels consumers actually see.182 According 
                                                                                                                      
173 Notification of an Appeal by the United States, United States–Certain Country of Ori-
gin Labeling Requirements, 1–2, WT/DS384/12, WT/DS386/11 (Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter 
U.S. COOL Appeal]. 
174 Appellate Body Report, United States–COOL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 349–350. 
175 Id. ¶ 289. 
176 Id. ¶¶ 289–290. 
177 Id. ¶ 288; Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, 
and Frozen Beef, ¶ 145, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report, Korea–Beef]. 
178 Appellate Body Report, United States–COOL, supra note 9, ¶ 293. 
179 Id. ¶¶ 293, 340; Appellate Body Report, United States–Tuna II, supra note 9, ¶¶ 240–
243; Appellate Body Report, United States–Clove Cigarettes, supra note 9, ¶¶ 180–182. 
180 Appellate Body Report, United States–COOL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 347–350. 
181 COOL U.S. First Written Submission, supra note 65, ¶¶ 206–225. 
182 Appellate Body Report, United States–COOL, supra note 9, ¶ 349. 
124 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:103 
to the Appellate Body, since consumers do not see an amount of origin 
information that is “commensurate” with the amount producers must 
keep track of, the regulatory distinction cannot be justified by a need to 
convey this information to consumers.183 The detrimental impact on 
Mexican and Canadian products stems from producers avoiding the 
segregation costs associated with keeping track of a large amount of 
origin information on imported livestock or meat.184 Accordingly, be-
cause the Appellate Body found the regulatory distinctions to be arbi-
trary, and “the disproportionate burden imposed on upstream produc-
ers and processors to be unjustifiable[,]” it ruled the COOL measure 
treated imported livestock less favorably than domestic livestock, and 
thus inconsistent with Article 2.1.185 
 The Appellate Body’s analysis here seems to mirror an analysis that 
would be done under the GATT Article XX chapeau.186 The chapeau is 
the final prong to test if a measure is justified under the GATT excep-
tion provision, Article XX.187 Similarly to the Appellate Body’s analysis 
in U.S.–COOL, to pass the chapeau, a measure cannot be “a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.”188 In effect, the chapeau test is a type of necessity 
test which considers how a measure is applied, how it contributes to its 
objective, and if less-trade restrictive alternatives are available.189 
b. Article 2.2 Analysis 
 The Panel in U.S.–COOL found the United States measure violated 
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement because it did not fulfill its objec-
tive.190 The Panel relied on the United States’ classification of its objec-
tive: “to provide consumers with as much clear and accurate origin in-
formation as possible about the origin of the meat products.”191 The 
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Panel stated that this objective could be considered legitimate under an 
Article 2.2 analysis.192 Although acknowledging that the COOL meas-
ure does provide consumers with more information than was available 
prior to being enacted, particularly with regards to Label A, the Panel 
took issue with how Labels B and C could confuse consumers.193 Addi-
tionally, the Panel thought that allowing the choice to use Label B or 
Label C for meat of different origin that commingle on the same pro-
duction day undermined the measure’s objective.194 Accordingly, the 
Panel found that the COOL measure failed to provide consumers with 
“as much clear and accurate origin information as possible,” and ended 
its analysis by concluding that the measure was inconsistent with Article 
2.2.195 
 The United States appealed this ruling, based on a number of 
complaints.196 One complaint regarded the Panel’s failure to find that 
the measure fulfilled its objective at a level considered appropriate by 
the United States.197 Unlike its decision on the United States’ Article 
2.1 appeal, this time the Appellate Body reversed the Panel.198 The Ap-
pellate Body started its analysis by reiterating the three-prong Article 
2.2 test established in U.S.–Tuna II, which determines (i) the degree to 
which the measure fulfills its legitimate objective, (ii) its trade restric-
tiveness, and (iii) the risks arising from non-fulfillment of the objec-
tive.199 
 With regard to the first prong, the Appellate Body noted that, to 
determine the objective of a measure, a panel should conduct a holistic 
assessment looking at the “structure and operation” of the measure, 
and not simply rely on the implementing Member’s classification, 
which the Panel did.200 Despite this guidance, however, the Appellate 
Body upheld the objective the Panel found for the COOL measure.201 
The Appellate Body took issue with the Panel putting the burden on 
the United States to prove that its objective was legitimate, and it took 
issue with the evidence the Panel used to find that consumers generally 
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prefer having origin information on their products.202 Nevertheless, 
the Appellate Body still affirmed the Panel’s finding that conveying 
meaningful origin information to consumers is a legitimate objective 
under Article 2.2.203 The Appellate Body noted the similarities of this 
objective to preventing deceptive practices, an objective recognized 
both in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement and GATT Article XX (d).204 
But, in the end, what mattered most to the Appellate Body was that 
Canada and Mexico failed to meet their burden of proof in persuading 
the Panel that the United States objective could not be legitimate.205 
 Continuing its test, the Appellate Body considered whether the 
COOL measure fulfills its legitimate objective, and came to a different 
conclusion than the Panel.206 The Appellate Body ruled that the Panel 
wrongly found that the measure did not fulfill enough of its objective.207 
Instead of setting a minimum contribution the measure must meet, the 
Appellate Body determined that the Panel should have considered the 
contribution the measure actually makes towards its objective.208 Thus, 
according to the Appellate Body, any contribution is sufficient.209 The 
degree of contribution is what matters when determining if the meas-
ure fulfills its legitimate objective, and is used to determine the objec-
tive’s trade restrictiveness and the risks of non-fulfillment of its objec-
tive.210 
 In the end, the Appellate Body found that the Panel committed a 
critical error by ignoring its own finding that the measure contributed 
to its objective by providing more origin information to consumers 
than was available before it was enacted.211 Consequently, the Appellate 
Body reversed the Panel’s finding.212 
 After faulting the Panel for ignoring its own findings and ending 
its analysis prematurely, the Appellate Body attempted to complete the 
Article 2.2 test.213 Without factual findings by the Panel as to whether a 
reasonably available less-trade restrictive alternate was available to the 
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United States, the Appellate Body stated it was unable to complete this 
analysis.214 The Appellate Body was presented with four alternative 
measures by Mexico and Canada, but would not definitively rule on the 
feasibility of these measures.215 As a result, the Appellate Body over-
ruled the Panel’s finding that the COOL measure was inconsistent with 
Article 2.2.216 
III. Analysis 
 In U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, U.S.–Tuna II, and U.S.–COOL, the Appellate 
Body showed its preference for finding violations under Article 2.1 as 
opposed to Article 2.2.217 This is significant because the Appellate 
Body’s analysis in each case will be applied to future TBT disputes and 
provide needed context for interpreting the TBT Agreement.218 More-
over, the results of the disputes affect the regulating power of WTO 
members and thus influence how domestic regulations are designed.219 
 By finding all of the disputed measures consistent with Article 2.2, 
the Appellate Body indicated that it would be difficult for a complain-
ant to prove a measure violates that provision.220 The Appellate Body 
presumably made this claim difficult to prove because it is more com-
fortable finding a violation using non-discrimination, which is widely 
recognized as the WTO’s core function, rather than necessity.221 Addi-
tionally, because the TBT Agreement does not have exception provi-
sions like GATT Article XX, if interpreted differently by the Appellate 
Body, Article 2.2 could greatly constrain the regulatory authority of 
WTO members.222 Thus, the Appellate Body’s unwillingness to find 
violations under the necessity provision reflects appropriate deference 
toward WTO members’ regulatory authority.223 
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 The deference the Appellate Body showed under Article 2.2 in 
these cases to WTO Members’ regulatory authority, however, is offset by 
an expansive interpretation of Article 2.1.224 In its search for discrimi-
nation under Article 2.1, after finding disparate impact, the Appellate 
Body seems to have added the chapeau test from GATT Article XX to 
determine whether the disparate impact is arbitrary and unjustifi-
able.225 In light of the purpose of the TBT Agreement to balance regu-
latory authority with trade liberalization, it makes sense that the Appel-
late Body used a second test, rather than finding a violation from 
disparate impact alone.226 
 The chapeau test is an effective test for Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement because it evaluates whether the discrimination is justifi-
able.227 In effect, however, the chapeau test also analyzes the necessity of 
a measure, which is why some have questioned the Appellate Body’s use 
of it in Article 2.1.228 Nonetheless, because it is used only after disparate 
impact has been found, the chapeau test used in Article 2.1 is a better 
way to test the necessity of technical regulations and to fulfill the pur-
pose of the TBT Agreement.229 By incorporating the chapeau test into 
its Article 2.1 analysis, the Appellate Body has effectively added an ex-
ception provision to the TBT Agreement.230 
A. The Role of Discrimination 
 In U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, discrimination was central to the dispute.231 
The United States’ objective was to deter its youth from starting to 
smoke.232 It attempted to achieve this objective by banning the flavored 
cigarettes that appealed to youths.233 Banning clove flavored cigarettes 
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from Indonesia but not menthol flavored cigarettes from the United 
States without justification for the difference in treatment reeks of dis-
crimination.234 
 On the other hand, in U.S.–Tuna II and U.S.–COOL, discrimina-
tion seemed less fundamental to the analysis.235 In U.S–Tuna II, al-
though Mexico argued that its tuna products were treated less favorably 
than tuna products from other countries or the United States, it pri-
marily argued that with the AIDCP requirements in effect, the U.S. la-
beling requirements were unnecessary.236 The Appellate Body, how-
ever, disagreed.237 Consequently, even with the Appellate Body finding 
the labeling scheme inconsistent with Article 2.1, Mexico is not likely to 
benefit from the United States complying with that ruling.238 
 In U.S.–COOL, discrimination was an issue because the meats were 
labeled by national origin, which easily creates a situation where im-
ported products are treated less favorably.239 But the meat was labeled 
by national origin to inform consumers of where their meats came 
from, which the Appellate Body determined is a legitimate objective.240 
If that is a legitimate objective, it follows that some discrimination must 
be acceptable.241 In fact, the Appellate Body seemed to suggest that, 
but still found discrimination because the burden on producers was too 
great given the small amount of information to be gleaned by consum-
ers.242 That discrimination is not the same type of discrimination the 
Panel dealt with in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes.243 Instead the Appellate Body 
seems to be implying that the COOL measure is more trade restrictive 
than necessary to fulfill its objective.244 
  After stating that the burden on producers was disproportionate 
compared to the amount of information consumers actually saw, the 
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Appellate Body still found the measure consistent with Article 2.2 be-
cause the Panel failed to evaluate any proposed alternatives.245 In U.S.–
Tuna II, the Appellate Body stated that considering alternative meas-
ures would frequently be important in an Article 2.2 analysis, but it did 
not say that it was an indispensable part of its balancing test.246 
 By circumventing the necessity issue in U.S.–Tuna II and U.S.–
COOL, and instead focusing on discrimination, the Appellate Body 
showed its preference for finding violations under Article 2.1 as op-
posed to Article 2.2.247 
B. Article 2.2: A Tough Claim to Prove 
 The Appellate Body decisions indicate that it will be very difficult 
for complaining countries to succeed with Article 2.2 claims.248 First, 
the Appellate Body stated that a measure need not satisfy a minimum 
level of contribution towards fulfilling its objective.249 In U.S.–COOL, 
for example, it was enough for the Appellate Body that the COOL 
measure provided more origin information to consumers than was 
available before the measure’s enactment.250 It did not matter that the 
Panel found the labels, particularly Labels B and C, to be confusing to 
consumers, because the labels were found to make some small degree 
of contribution to the United States’ regulatory objective.251 Recogniz-
ing this degree of contribution, the Appellate Body “set a low bar” for 
what level of contribution to an objective is sufficient.252 Thus, a mem-
ber challenging a regulation under Article 2.2 will not likely succeed if 
a country claims that the measure is unnecessary because it does not 
adequately fulfill its objective.253 
 Instead, complainants must present an alternative, less trade-
restrictive measure that contributes to the respondent’s objective to at 
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least the same degree.254 That will likely be a difficult task for com-
plainants and is another reason why the Appellate Body’s decisions in-
dicate that it will be tough for complainants to prove a violation under 
Article 2.2.255 For example, in U.S.–Tuna II, Mexico suggested using the 
AIDCP labeling scheme in conjunction with the more restrictive DPCIA 
labeling scheming as an alternative.256 The Panel found this alternative 
to be a less trade-restrictive alternative that, like the DPCIA labeling 
scheme, also partially fulfills the United States’ objectives.257 But the 
Appellate Body disagreed.258 
 Instead of considering the measure’s degree of contribution as a 
whole, as the Panel did, the Appellate Body narrowed its analysis to ef-
fects only within the ETP and concluded the existing measure contrib-
utes to a greater degree than Mexico’s proposed alternative.259 The 
Appellate Body’s narrowing of its analysis, rather than considering the 
measure’s overall contribution to its objectives, made it more difficult 
for Mexico’s alternative to satisfy its burden.260 The narrow scope of the 
Appellate Body’s analysis does not bode well for future complainants.261 
 The Appellate Body likely made Article 2.2 violations difficult to 
prove because it is reluctant to conclude that domestic regulations are 
unnecessary.262 It is more willing to find violations using discrimination, 
like under Article 2.1, because preventing discrimination is widely rec-
ognized as the fundamental obligation of WTO members.263 On the 
other hand, the WTO is not in the business of telling governments how 
to fulfill State objectives.264 Additionally, if the Appellate Body liberally 
condemns measures for being more trade restrictive than necessary, it 
could be perceived as pushing its members too far towards trade liber-
alization.265 Thus, the WTO probably did not want to risk losing legiti-
macy and instead chose to use the safer non-discrimination principle, 
which is more in alignment with the WTO’s expertise.266 
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 Moreover, the Appellate Body likely made Article 2.2 a difficult 
claim to prove because, if interpreted more expansively, this provision 
could be very constraining on the domestic regulatory power of WTO 
members.267 Unlike the GATT, the TBT Agreement does not have ex-
ception provisions.268 One of the GATT’s exception provisions is Article 
XX, which contains its own version of a necessity test in clauses (a), (b), 
and (d).269 Because these are affirmative defenses, the necessity test is 
only conducted after a violation of another provision, like national 
treatment or MFN, is found.270 If a measure is non-discriminatory, its 
necessity will likely never be tested under the GATT.271 Conversely, Ar-
ticle 2.2 is a primary analysis, so panels determine whether a measure is 
more trade restrictive than necessary to determine if a violation ex-
ists.272 Even if a measure is non-discriminatory, its necessity can still be 
tested under the TBT Agreement.273 Thus, because the TBT Agree-
ment tests necessity in a stand-alone provision, if given more force by 
the Appellate Body, Article 2.2 could limit domestic regulatory author-
ity more than the GATT.274 
 Some international trade theorists suggest that the necessity test 
under the TBT Agreement is more deferential to defendants because 
the burden is on complainants to show a violation, as opposed to GATT 
Article XX, which places the burden on defendants to justify their 
measure.275 That idea was not universally accepted and, until the Ap-
pellate Body decided a case under Article 2.2, it was unknown how 
strictly this provision would be interpreted.276 Additionally, it is impor-
tant to note that under GATT Article XX, the burden only switches to 
defendants if complainants first succeed in proving a violation.277 
 Nevertheless, by making Article 2.2 a difficult claim to prove, the 
Appellate Body appropriately showed deference to its members’ regula-
tory authority.278 Ruling otherwise could have significantly inhibited 
WTO members from implementing technical regulations designed to 
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fulfill health, environmental, or consumer objectives.279 For example, 
the Appellate Body could have agreed with the Panel in U.S.–COOL 
that a technical regulation must meet a minimum level of contribution 
or else it is more trade restrictive than necessary.280 That would put an 
additional burden on regulating countries to ensure that their meas-
ures meet a sufficient level of contribution.281 To make matters worse, 
this minimum level of contribution is not evaluated by the regulating 
country, but instead by a WTO Panel, ex post facto.282 
 Additionally, the Appellate Body could have infringed on its mem-
bers’ regulatory power by accepting the analysis format employed by 
the Panel when evaluating Mexico’s proposed alternative in U.S.–Tuna 
II.283 By rejecting that analysis, the Appellate Body indicated that a less-
trade restrictive alternative will not be accepted even when it contrib-
utes the same degree to the overall objective, if it contributes to a lesser 
degree in one location or to one element.284 If the Panel’s analysis was 
accepted, countries would have to ensure that their regulations con-
tributed to their objectives to a sufficient degree in every location, or a 
less-trade restrictive alternative that lowers the degree of contribution 
in a single area could triumph if it does not lower the measure’s overall 
level of contribution.285 
C. Filling the Gap with Article 2.1 
 The deference that the Appellate Body showed to the regulatory 
authority of WTO members while interpreting Article 2.2 is counter-
balanced by its expansive interpretation of Article 2.1.286 By finding vio-
lations in U.S.–Tuna II and U.S.–COOL, the Appellate Body added a ne-
cessity test to Article 2.1.287 Although this interpretation restricts the 
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regulatory authority of WTO members, it is a fitting way to give the 
TBT Agreement force, while avoiding the problems of an overly expan-
sive Article 2.2.288 
 In all three cases, after finding disparate impact on the complain-
ants’ products as a result of the measure, the Appellate Body consid-
ered whether that disparate impact could be explained by a “legitimate 
regulatory distinction.”289 In light of the purpose of the TBT Agree-
ment, balancing trade liberalization with regulatory protection, that is a 
logical next step.290 Disparate impact alone should not be enough to 
find a violation under Article 2.1 because regulatory objectives some-
times require discrimination between products with different geo-
graphic origins.291 For example, if a country exclusively exports an un-
healthy product that another country wants to ban because of its health 
effects, then the resulting disparate impact is only incidental to the 
regulation.292 The United States tried to justify its measure on those 
grounds in U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, but the Appellate Body was not per-
suaded and appropriately found no legitimate regulatory distinction 
between menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes.293  But if the United 
State could prove a legitimate regulatory distinctions–-for example, if 
clove cigarettes were more addictive than menthol cigarettes---then the 
measure would not have violated Article 2.1.294 
 In U.S.–Tuna II, the Appellate Body concluded that the different 
“dolphin-safe” labeling requirements at issue were not proportionally 
calibrated to the risks of dolphin injury from different fishing methods 
in different oceans.295 The United States argued that its labeling 
scheme needed to be more stringent in the ETP because the risk to 
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dolphins was higher there.296 Outside the ETP, however, dolphins still 
face significant risks from tuna fishing.297 Accordingly, the Appellate 
Body concluded that the different requirements are not designed to 
evenly respond to the likelihood of harm to dolphins.298 Since the re-
quirements were not proportionally calibrated, they are not “even-
handed,” and the disparate impact is not justified by a legitimate regu-
latory distinction.299 In this manner, the Appellate Body used propor-
tionality to find discrimination under Article 2.1.300 Proportionality, 
however, is traditionally only relevant when determining if a measure is 
more trade restrictive than necessary, like in Article 2.2 or GATT Article 
XX.301 
 In U.S.–COOL, the Appellate Body concluded that the need to 
convey origin information to consumers could not justify  the regula-
tory distinction because consumers were not seeing an amount of ori-
gin information that was “commensurate” with the amount producers 
had to record.302 As a result, the Appellate Body found the regulatory 
distinction arbitrary and “the disproportionate burden imposed on up-
stream producers and processors to be unjustifiable.”303 Thus, in ruling 
that the COOL measure was inconsistent with Article 2.1 for treating 
imported livestock less favorably than domestic livestock, the Appellate 
Body took the proportionality test further than U.S.–Tuna II, employing 
an analysis that mirrored the GATT Article XX chapeau test.304 
 Incorporating the chapeau test in an Article 2.1 analysis is an effec-
tive way to test the necessity of a discriminatory measure without exces-
sively inhibiting the regulatory authority of WTO members.305 Testing 
necessity this way avoids the concerns of an expansive Article 2.2 be-
cause this test is only used after a measure is found to be discrimina-
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tory.306 Additionally, it makes sense that the Appellate Body would draw 
on the chapeau test, given that the TBT Agreement and GATT Article 
XX have similar purposes and the chapeau is designed to detect dis-
crimination.307 But in effect, the chapeau test also considers the neces-
sity of a measure by evaluating how it is applied, how it contributes to its 
objective, and if less-trade restrictive alternatives are available.308 Article 
2.1 was not designed to test the necessity of a measure; it was designed 
to balance discrimination with legitimate regulation.309 Thus, the Ap-
pellate Body could have found the measure in U.S.–COOL consistent 
with Article 2.1 because the regulatory distinction is the origin of meat 
and wanting to convey origin information to consumers is a legitimate 
objective.310 Instead, the Appellate Body conducted its more expansive 
Article 2.1 analysis.311 First, it found the measure caused disparate im-
pact; and subsequently, it found the disparate impact to be arbitrary 
and unjustifiable because the costs to producers were disproportionate 
to the benefits for consumers.312 
 The only flaw in the Appellate Body’s analysis is that neither it, nor 
the Panel, did a complete cost-benefit analysis of less trade restrictive 
alternatives.313 Yet, the Appellate Body suggested that a less-trade re-
strictive alternative would require producers to keep track of less in-
formation.314 But without a cost-benefit analysis, it is unclear that an 
alternative requiring less information from producers would be effec-
tive in fulfilling the United States’ objective and would be reasonably 
available for implementation.315 In future disputes, panels and the Ap-
pellate Body should conduct a full cost-benefit analysis to determine 
whether less-trade restrictive alternatives are reasonably available to the 
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implementing country before finding a violation under Article 2.1.316 
Otherwise, Article 2.1 will stifle the regulatory power of countries by 
punishing them for implementing a measure designed to meet an ob-
jective without determining whether a feasible alternative exists.317 
 Nonetheless, using a test like the GATT Article XX chapeau after 
finding disparate impact in an Article 2.1 analysis is an effective way to 
balance trade liberalization with regulatory protection because this test 
functions as an exception provision for the TBT Agreement.318 Like 
GATT Article XX, this test is only applied after a violation, disparate 
impact, is found.319 Thus, countries will still be able to implement 
measures, whether food labeling or environmental regulations, which 
discriminate for legitimate reasons, so long as the resulting disparate 
impact is reasonably designed to respond to the regulatory objective 
and is thus not arbitrary.320 Additionally, evaluating necessity under Ar-
ticle 2.1 avoids the concerns of an overly expansive interpretation of 
Article 2.2 because necessity is not tested in a primary analysis.321 The 
Appellate Body will only evaluate whether a measure meets a sufficient 
level of contribution to the regulatory objective after disparate impact 
is found under Article 2.1.322 Moreover, the Appellate Body’s legitimacy 
is less likely to be questioned because it is using necessity only to pre-
vent discrimination, the main concern of the WTO.323 Therefore, the 
Appellate Body’s interpretation of the TBT Agreement should prove to 
be a successful way to balance the rights of its members to implement 
technical regulations with the prevention of protectionism.324 
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Conclusion 
 U.S.–Clove Cigarettes, U.S.–Tuna II, and U.S.–COOL are significant 
cases for a number of reasons. First, because the Appellate Body found 
the three regulations in violation of the TBT Agreement, the United 
States must amend or repeal the measures, or risk likely retaliatory 
trade action from the complaining countries. Thus, these rulings will 
influence how the United States regulates cigarettes, tuna products, 
and meat sales. More importantly, these three cases are the first cases in 
which the Appellate Body considered two key provisions of the TBT 
Agreement. Accordingly, the Appellate Body’s interpretation and analy-
ses of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 will be used in future TBT disputes. 
 Although the Appellate Body found three violations, its interpreta-
tions of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 ultimately were deferential to the regulat-
ing authority of WTO members. In future disputes, complainants will 
have a difficult time proving a violation of Article 2.2 because of how 
the Appellate Body interpreted that provision. The deference to regu-
lating countries, however, comes with a price. The Appellate Body 
added a version of a necessity test to Article 2.1. This reading of Article 
2.1 limits the regulatory authority of WTO members, but it is a fairer 
way to test the necessity of a measure because it is used only after find-
ing a measure disparately impacts the complainant. Thus, countries can 
still implement discriminatory technical regulations that pursue legiti-
mate objectives, so long as the discrimination is justified. The Appellate 
Body’s calculated decision to make Article 2.2 a difficult claim to prove 
while adding force to Article 2.1 should successfully protect the regula-
tory power of countries and prevent forms of protectionism. To suc-
ceed in challenging a technical regulation, however, members should 
phrase their complaints in terms of Article 2.1 discrimination rather 
than Article 2.2 necessity. 
